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Abstract 
Few of us give much thought to local laws, yet local laws, such 
as zoning and other land use regulations, have an abiding 
infl,uence on our lives. Think for a few moments about the types of 
businesses located near your home. Are these businesses places you 
frequent? Considering socio-economics, how do land uses differ 
from locale to locale throughout your city or state? Do all citizens 
have an equal voice in the land use approval process? The answer 
is likely no, which creates environmental and economic justice 
issues. 
Like all businesses, when it comes to payday lenders, 
geography matters. Payday lenders and other high-cost loan 
providers charge between 300% to 1,000% interest on consumer 
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loans, a fact that concerns many consumer advocates. For decades, 
we have known another disturbing fact - by locating storefronts in 
neighborhoods frequented by certain demographic groups, payday 
lenders and other providers of high-cost credit target people of 
color, low-income and moderate-income Americans, military 
personnel, and the elderly. What we did not know until now, 
however, was whether this targeting succeeds in increasing loan 
usage by these groups. 
This Article examines the extent to which living near a payday 
lender increases the likelihood that a consumer will use one. A 
growing body of literature examines the possible spatial patterns of 
alternative financial services, but here we add to that literature by 
explicitly exploring the relationship between distance and density 
of payday loan stores and consumer use of such loans. The study 
described in this Article finds that consumers who live closer to 
payday lenders are more likely to use the loans and that if a 
consumer lives near more than one, he or she is even more likely to 
use the loans. The study results suggest local payday loan 
ordinances that limit the number of lenders, or forbid lenders from 
certain areas, effectively limit the harm caused by such high-cost 
loans. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As geographer Waldo Tobler famously noted, "everything is 
related to everything else" but near things are more related than 
distant things. 1 In other words, geography matters. In the law, 
geography is often controlled by local ordinances rather than state 
or federal laws. Fed up with a lack of regulatory efforts at the 
state or federal level, many consumer advocates concerned about 
payday loan abuses are turning to local laws to curb abusive 
payday loan practices. Our study shows that these efforts are 
likely to bear fruit in the form of meaningful payday loan reform 
that might reduce unconscionable payday loan practices. 
Think for a few moments about the types of businesses 
located near your home. How did these businesses arrive in your 
neighborhood? In other words, who approved them for this 
location and why? Considering socio-economics, how do land uses 
differ from locale to locale throughout your city or state? Do all 
citizens have an equal voice in the land use approval process? The 
answer is likely no, which creates environmental and economic 
justice issues. People who control which businesses appear in 
communities have significant influence on the everyday lives of 
those who live there, perhaps much more influence than most of 
us have previously understood. 
Local lawmakers should think long and hard about zoning 
and other local land use regulation, given the broad influence of 
these regulations on society.2 Mayors, city council members, and 
city planners now have evidence that the business and other uses 
such as parks and community centers they approve for their cities, 
have an impact on citizen well-being. Perhaps it is obvious that 
approving a license or zoning application for a liquor store, a fast­
food restaurant, a payday lender, or a bar will result in more use 
of those businesses. Conversely, it makes sense to assume that 
installing parks, basketball courts, health food stores, grocery 
stores and community gardens will improve well-being to a 
1 Waldo Tobler, A Computer Movie Simulating Urban Growth in the Detroit 
Regwn, 46 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 234, 236 (1970). 
2 Nathalie Martin & Robert N. Mayer, What Communities Can Do to Rein in 
Payday Lending: Strategies for Successful Local Ordinance Campaigns Through a 
Texas Lens, 80 L. & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 147, 175 (2017). 
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greater extent than liquor stores, bars or payday lenders.3 In this 
Article, we test this broad hypothesis in the context of the 
geography of payday loan stores as this geography affects payday 
loan usage. In so doing, we provide valuable data for mayors, city 
councils, and city planners who wish to be more proactive in 
improving the health and well-being of communities across our 
nation. 
Payday, title and high-cost installment lenders may charge 
interest rates from 100% per annum to 1100% per annum.4 While 
some scholars laud these lenders as godsends for people with poor 
credit and few other options, many others in society fear that the 
lenders ultimately do most consumers more harm than good. 5 
Although there are a number of exceptions, federal legislation 
requires lenders disclose their interest rates on an annual basis, 
meaning lenders must tell consumers the interest they are 
charging. 6 Nevertheless, these interest rates are often obfuscated 
if not completely hidden from consumers. 7 
There is no federal interest rate cap on consumer loans, 
except for loans made to military personnel and their families, in 
which case lenders can charge only 36% or less per annum.8 In 
3 See Lee R. Maheswaran, The Health Benefits of Urban Green Spaces: A Review of 
the Evidence, 33 J. PUB. HEALTH 212, 212 (2011) (''Most studies reported findings that 
generally supported the view that green space have a beneficial health effect."). See 
generally Deborah A. Cohen et al., Contribution of Public Parks to Physical Activity, 97 
AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 509 (2007) (evidencing the critical role parks play in facilitating 
physical activity in minority communities). 
4 See Nathalie Martin, 1,000% Interest-Good While Supplies Last: A Study of 
Payday Loan Practices and Solutions, 62 ARIZ. L. REV. 563, 564 n.1 (2010) [hereinafter 
Martin, 1,000% Interest] (''The [payday] loans on which we gathered data ranged in 
interest rates from 100% per annum to 1100% per annum."). 
6 Compare Payday Lending in America: Who Borrows, Where They Borrow, and 
Why, PEW CHARITABLE TRUST, (July 19, 2012), available at 
https://www.pewtrusts.org/research-and-analysis/reports/2012/07/19/who-borrows­
where-they-borrow-and-why [hereinafter PEW CHARITABLE TRUST, Payday Lending] 
with Martin, supra note 4, at 664. 
6 Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f (2012). 
7 See, e.g., James v. Nat'l Fin. LLC, 2014 WL 6845560 (Del. Ch. 2014). 
8 See 10 U.S.C. §987(a)-(b) (2012) ("A creditor who extends consumer credit to a 
covered member of the armed forces or a dependent of such a member . . . may not 
impose an annual percentage rate of interest greater than 36 percent with respect to 
the consumer credit extended . . .  "); 32 C.F.R. §232.4(b) (2016) ("A creditor may not 
impose an [Military Annual Percentage Rate] greater than 36 percent in connection 
with an extension of consumer credit that is closed-end credit or in any billing cycle for 
open-end credit."). 
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2007, a bipartisan Congress enthusiastically passed the Military 
Lending Act, after evidence emerged that high-cost loans like 
payday and title loans were interfering with military readiness. 9 
Military personnel and their families are now protected by the 
36% federal interest rate cap, but what about the rest of us? 
Concern over harm to consumers caused state legislators, city 
councils, religious and consumer groups to look for alternatives to 
federal legislation to curb abuses in this controversial industry.10 
These non-federal legal actions include state legislation, among 
other patchwork solutions. 11 
Legal scholars, geographers and others have empirically 
shown that lenders offering payday loans, title loans and high-cost 
installment loans often locate their stores outside military bases 
and in low-income and minority neighborhoods.12 Scholars also 
9 See Steven M. Graves & Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Lending and the 
Military: The Law and Geography of Payday Loans Military Towns, 66 OHIO ST. L. J. 
663, 832 (2006). 
10 See PEW CHARITABLE TRUST, Payday Lending, supra note 6; What The People 
Think Of Payday Lending, PYMNTS.COM, (Apr. 26, 2017), available at 
https://www.pymnts.com/news/alternative-financial-services/2017/pew-charitable­
trusts-payday-lending-figures-short-term-loans-cfpb-regulation/. 
11 Nathalie Martin, Public Opinion and The Limits of State Law: The Case for a 
Federal Usury Cap, 34 N. ILL. L. REV. 259, 273 (2014) [hereinafter Martin, Public 
Opinion]. 
12 See, e.g., Graves & Peterson, supra note 9, at 832 (evidencing payday lenders 
target military personnel); Steven M. Graves, Landscapes of Predation, Landscapes of 
Neglect: A Location Analysis of Payday Lenders and Banks, 66 PROF. GEOGRAPHER 303, 
312 (2003) [hereinafter Graves, Landscapes] (suggesting the payday lending industry 
targets neighborhoods with a higher percentage of poor and minority residents); 
William C., Apgar, Jr., & Christopher E. Herbert, Subprime Lending and Alternative 
Financial Service Providers: A Literature Review and Empirical Analysis, U.S. DEF'T 
HOUSING & URB. DEV. OFF. POL 'y DEV. & RES. Ill, Il60-1 (2004) (alternative financial 
service providers are highly concentrated in lower income neighborhoods and in 
neighborhoods where Hispanics comprise a significant share of the population); 
Kenneth Temkin & Noah Sawyer, Analysis of Alternative Financial Service Providers, 
FANNIE MAE FOUND. (2004), 
https://www.urban.org/sites/ default/files/ alfresco/publication-pdfs/ 410936-Analysis-of­
Alterna tive-Financial-Service-Providers.PDF (alternative financial service providers 
cluster in minority and low-income neighborhoods); Wei Li, et al., Predatory Profiling: 
The Role of Race and Ethnicity in the Location of Payday Lenders in California, CTR. 
FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING (2009), 
http://www.responsiblelending.org/payday-lending/research-analysis/predatory­
profiling.pdf (racial and ethnic composition of neighborhoods is the primary predicator 
of payday lending locations); Robin A. Prager, Determinants of the Locations of Payday 
Lenders, Pawnshops and Check-Cashing Outlet, 46 R. INDUS. ORG. 21, 37-38 (2014); 
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have demonstrated that customers of these lenders do not shop 
around for price when choosing loan but typically choose a lender 
based upon location or a third-party recommendation. 13 Perhaps it 
is no surprise that living near one or more payday lending 
establishments increases the likelihood that a consumer will use 
these loans. Three of the authors - a geographer and two social 
workers - devised a study to test the premise that having payday 
lender(s) in the neighborhood increases payday loan usage by 
neighborhood residents. This Article describes that study, the first 
empirical study to establish definitively that living near payday 
loan establishments increase the likelihood that a consumer will 
use the loans. The study has important implications for both state 
legislatures and local governments who seek to limit the number 
stores in a particular place or prohibit payday lenders entirely. 
Whether in favor or opposed to regulating payday loans, few 
people argue payday loan stores increase the panache of a 
neighborhood. Indeed, in recent years, payday loans have joined 
the ever-ubiquitous liquor stores,14 limited nutritious food stores, 15 
and toxic waste dumps16 that have always proliferated in 
disadvantaged communities. Payday loans are cash advances 
made with the promise of a payback with interest, following 
receipt of the borrower's next paycheck. Unfortunately, the arrival 
of payday rarely makes paying the loan easy. The loans are easy 
to take out but hard to repay. High interest rates add up quickly, 
and while the loans are framed as term loans that can be repaid in 
short order, they are designed to continue extracting the bi-weekly 
Ellen S. Schultz & Theo Francis, High-Interest Lenders Tap Elderly, Disabled, WALL 
STREET J. (Feb. 12, 2008), http://www.wsj.com/artic1es/SB120277630957260703 
(payday lenders cluster around government-subsidized housing and the disabled). 
13 PEW CHARITABLE TRUST, Payday Lending, supra note 5, at 15. 
14 See Greg Hinz, Potent Mix: Liquor, Poverty, CRAIN'S CHICAGO Bus. (Jan. 18, 
1997), http://www.chicagobusiness.com/ article/19970118/ISSUEO 1/10005 7 51/potent­
mix (''Low-income, minority neighborhoods and suburbs are far more likely to be home 
to package liquor stores than middle-to-upscale white areas."). 
16 See Kelly M. Bower, et al., The Intersection of Neighborhood Racial Segregation, 
Poverty, and Urbanicity and Its Impact on Food Store Availability in the United States, 
58 PREVENTIVE MED. 33, 35-38 (2014) (the number of convenience stores increases as 
the level of neighborhood poverty increases). 
16 See Evan J. Ringquist, Equity and the Distribution of Environmental Risk: The 
Case of TRI Facilities, 78 Soc. Ser. Q. 811, 826-27 (1997). 
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fee. In other words, most are not designed to be repaid.17 
Refinancing, sometimes many times over, is often inevitable due 
to the short-term and non-amortizing structure of the loans. 
Consumer borrowers plunge deeper and deeper into debt, which 
further erodes borrowers' financial stability and opportunities to 
create wealth.18 Initially, these loans seem attractive to low and 
moderate-income consumers with weaker credit histories, because 
they require no credit check and are relatively quick to arrange, 
but borrowers learn quickly that the loans have a deep, dark 
side.19 
In the absence of the federal regulation of payday loans, 
states attempt to control the use of these high interest loans by 
either limiting the amount of interest charged or capping the 
number and amount of loans an individual may take out.20 In 
addition to state action, some local governments enact ordinances 
zoning the density of payday loan shops within an area through 
the use of anti-concentration ordinances, the distance of store 
locations from residential areas, or to impose other geographical 
and non-geographical limitations.21 
17 PEW CHARITABLE TRUST, Payday Lending, supra note 5, at 15 (Lenders say in 
their marketing materials that the loans are not designed for long-term use, but this is 
untrue. The loans are designed for long-term use. Indeed, the average borrower is 
indebted for payday loans five to seven months a year). 
18 Younghee Lim, et al., Payday Loan Use and Consumer Well-Being: What 
Consumers and Social Workers Need to Know about Payday Loans, 18 J. POVERTY 379, 
390 (2014). 
19 Id. 
20 See Signe-Mary McKernan, et al., Prohibitions, Price Caps, and Disclosures: A 
Look at State Policies and Alternative Financial Product Use, 95 J. ECON. BEHAV. & 
ORG. 207, 213 (2013). 
21 See Graves, Landscapes, supra note 12, at 309; Sheila Foster, Breaking Up 
Payday: Anti-Agglomeration Zoning and Consumer Welfare, 75 OHIO ST. L. J. 57, 76-78 
(2014); see generally Amy Lavine, Zoning Out Payday Loan Stores and Other 
Alternative Financial Services Providers (July 13, 2011), 
http://papers. ssrn. corn/sol3/pa pers.cfm ?abstract_id=l 885197 ( unpublished manuscript) 
(overviewing approaches local governments have taken to regulate alternative 
financial service providers); Kelly Griffith, et. al., Controlling the Growth of Payday 
Lending Through Local Ordinances and Resolutions: A Guide for Advocacy Groups and 
Government Officials (2012), 
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/Resources.PDL.LocalOrdinanceManual 11.13.12. pelf. 
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While research on the effects of state and local payday loan 
laws is limited and findings are mixed, 22 our study differs from 
past studies by examining the relationship between the distance 
and density of payday loan stores and consumer use of payday 
loans. Exploration of this relationship informs policymakers about 
the efficacy of location and density regulations as a means of 
protecting the consumer. 
Part II of this Article describes the legal landscape of payday 
loans and other high-cost loan and also describes the various types 
of loans and how this variation developed.23 This Part describes 
the history of usury in the United States and the ways in which 
states and local government attempt to regulate payday loans, in 
light of federal inaction. Part III describes the bifurcation of U.S. 
financial markets and explains how the geography theories of 
distance decay and localization economies affect payday 
markets.24 Part IV describes our study methodology and results.25 
In Part V, we conclude with lessons for local policy makers on how 
our data can be used to create meaningful local payday loan 
ordinances, which can in turn improve the lives of people in our 
towns and cities nationwide.26 
I. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE: TYPES OF HIGH-COST LOANS, 
USURY LAWS, AND REGULATION OF HIGH-COST LOANS 
Current regulation of payday and other high-cost loans are 
the worst kind of regulation - extensive but not effective.27 This 
regulation takes up a great deal of space in the legal landscape 
but is designed to be neither effective nor efficient. Rather, lenders 
lobby for laws that appear thoughtful and rigorous but are 
22 Compare Christopher S. Fowler, et al., The Geography of Fringe Banking, 64 J. 
REGIONAL Ser. 688, 703 (2014) (explaining local and state regulatory environment does 
not affect the total number of payday loan establishments), and Temkin & Sawyer, 
supra note 12, at 27-8, with McKernan, et. al. supra note 20, at 216 (contending state 
regulations effectively regulate use of alternative financial services and payday 
lenders), and James R., Barth, et. al., Do State Regulations Affect Payday Lender 
Concentration?, 84 J. ECON. & Bus. 14, 23-4 (2016) (same). 
23 See infra notes 27-83 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 84-116 and accompanying text. 
25 See infra notes 117-33 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 134-40 and accompanying text. 
27 Martin, Public Opinion, supra note 11, at 273. 
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neither.28 As explained below, historically, regulating high-cost 
consumer credit was left primarily to the states. A few federal 
laws also apply, making the resulting patchwork a complex 
labyrinth.29 Local governments, fed up with inaction on state and 
federal level, joined the party, leading to a third level of 
regulation.30 These developments are discussed in detail in this 
section, along with a description of usury laws and the various 
types of high-cost loans in the marketplace today. 
A. Types of High-Cost Loans 
While our study measures only the use of traditional payday 
loans, knowledge of the fragmented market helps us regulate 
high-cost credit in the future. Lenders design a variety of high­
cost loans that provide access to people who may not have access 
to credit, often at rates of 300-1,000% interest or more.31 Terms of 
different loan products vary greatly. One example is the "payday" 
loan, so named because its original purpose was to help a 
customer survive a short-term cash flow crisis between now and 
payday.32 In a typical payday loan, a consumer borrows money at 
a rate of between $15 and $25 per $100 for a period of fourteen 
days or less.33 In other words, if a consumer was paid four days 
ago but is already out of cash, she can go borrow, for example, 
28 See id. 
29 Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f (2018); Electronic Funds 
Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r (2018). 
30 See generally Martin & Mayer, supra note 2. 
31 Martin, 1,000% Interest, supra note 4, at 586-90; From Payday to Small 
Installment Loans: Risks, Opportunities, and Policy Proposals for Successful Markets, 
PEW CHARITABLE TRUST (Aug. 2016), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and­
analysis/issue-briefs/2016/08/from •payday-to-small-installment-loans [hereinafter 
From Payday to Small Installment Loans] ("The trend among payday and auto title 
lenders toward offering installment loans is being driven by three factors: consumer 
preference, regulatory pressure, and lenders' effort to avoid consumer protections put 
in place for lump-sum payment loans."). 
32 See Ronald J. Mann & Jim Hawkins, Just Until Payday, 54 UCLA L. REV. 855, 
857 (2007) (explaining the mechanics of a typical payday loan); Karen E. Francis, Note, 
Rollover, Rollover: A Behavioral Law and Economics Analysis of the Payday Loan 
Industry, 88 TEX. L. REV. 611, 611-12 (2010) (describing a payday loan transaction); 
Martin, 1,000% Interest, supra note 4, at 564 (Payday loans "were originally designed 
to tide a consumer over until payday, and then be paid back in one lump sum when the 
consumer received her paycheck."). 
33 Martin, 1,000% Interest, supra note 4, at 564. 
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$400 between now and her next payday (now ten days away). To 
receive the $400 at a $15 per $100 rate she needs a checking 
account and writes a check, or authorizes an automatic debit, for 
$460 post-dated to her next payday.34 When payday comes, she 
can either let the check or debit clear, assuming the unlikely event 
that she now has this money, or she can go in and pay another $60 
to borrow the same $400 for the next two weeks. This loan carries 
an annual interest rate of 390% or more. 
Another loan type is the longer high-cost "installment loan[,]" 
created to skirt state laws enacted to curb the classic difficult-to­
pay, short-term, non-amortizing, payday loan.35 In one such 
installment loan, a customer borrows $100, to be repaid in twenty­
six bi-weekly installments of $40. 16 each, plus a final installment 
of $55.34. 36 In total, this borrower pays a total of $1,099.71  on a 
$100 loan. The annual percentage rate on the loan is 1 , 147%.37 
Another type of high-cost loan is the auto title loan, for which 
consumers do not need bank accounts.38 Rather borrowers simply 
need an unencumbered automobile to secure the loan. These loans 
carry a typical interest rate of 25% per month or 300% per 
annum.39 While title loans typically carry lower interest rates 
34 See id. 
35 See generally From Payday to Small Installment Loans, supra note 31. 
36 See State v. B & B Investment Group, No. D-0lOl0CV-2009-01916, ii 7 (N.M. 
Dec. 3, 2010). See also Felix Salmon, Loan Sharking Datapoints of the Day, REUTERS 
(Jan. 7, 2010), http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2010/01/07/loan-sharking­
datapoints-of-the-day/. 
37 See B & B Investment Group, No. D-0lOlOCV-2009-01916 at ,i 7. See also 
Salmon, supra note 36. This assumes lender is unable to convince borrower to re­
borrow the principal before the loan is repaid. 
38 See Auto Title Loans: Market Practices and Borrowers' Experiences, PEW 
CHARITABLE TRUSTS 5-6 (Mar. 2015), 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2015/03/autotitleloansreport.pdf [hereinafter 
Auto Title Loans] (noting that title loans tend to be larger than payday loans on 
average); Jim Hawkins, et al., Dude, Where's My Car Title?: The Law, Behavior, and 
Economics of Title Lending Markets, 2014 Ill. L. Rev. 1013, 1035 (2014) (noting study 
results that only 56% of title loans customers surveyed appeared to have bank 
relationships). See generally Nathalie Martin & Ozymandias Adams, Grand Theft Auto 
Loans: Repossession and Demographic Realities in Title Lending, 77 Mo. L. REV. 41 
(2012) (analyzing empirical data associated with auto title loans). 
39 See Hawkins, et. al., supra note 38, at 1014-15 ("The most common term for the 
[title] loan is one month, the interest rate charged is commonly around 300% (when 
expressed as an annual percentage rate) . . .  "); Martin & Adams, supra note 38, at 48 
(concluding interest rates for title loans are typically 100%-300% per annum). 
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than payday loans, they may be larger loans, increasing the 
difficulty to repay and creating debt traps.40 Title loans also 
subject borrowers to the possibility of losing their vehicle, a risk 
not encountered with the other forms of high-cost loans described 
here. In a prior study, one of the authors found that in one year in 
New Mexico, as many as 71 % of title loan borrowers lost their cars 
to repossession.41 Our study, described in Part IV, analyzed only 
traditional payday loan use, which was the predominant type of 
high-cost loan used in Louisiana at the time of our data collection. 
B. History of U.S. Usury Laws 
Until recently, most U.S. states had usury laws that capped 
interests on consumer loans.42 Usury laws date back to the 
earliest civilizations and are one of the simplest ways to protect 
consumers from harsh credit practices.43 Even Adam Smith, the 
father of modern economic theory, believed interest rate caps were 
40 Constance Brinkley-Badgett, Title Loans vs. Payday Loans: A Side-by-Side 
Comparison, CREDIT.COM, February 2, 2016, available at 
https://blog.credit.com/2016/02/title-loans-vs-payday-loans-a-side-by-side-comparison­
(last accessed on February 24, 2019)(stating that "title loan amounts are about $1,000 
versus $375 for payday loans, the survey found. This is one reason that the estimated 
$1,200 spent annually by an average title loan borrower on fees is more than twice the 
$520 spent a year by an average payday loan borrower . . .  "). 
See also Hawkins et al., supra note 38, at 1041 {Professor Jim Hawkins and his 
coauthors found that borrowers do not fully understand the costs associated with title 
loans. The people he surveyed did not exhibit an understanding of the high relative 
cost of title loans compared to credit card debt. Only 25.71% (n = 9) recognized that a 
title loan is a lot more expensive than credit card debt, while 17.14% (n = 6) thought a 
title loan is a lot less expensive than credit card debt. 5. 71 % (n = 2) thought a title loan 
was a little less expensive than credit card debt, and 31.43% (n = 11) thought the two 
were about the same cost. While this small sample of people may not be indicative of 
borrowers generally, it is disturbing how few people understood the relative cost of 
their title loan.). 
41 Martin & Adams, supra note 38, at 45 ("[O]ur research shows that as many as 
71 % of the title loan customers have their vehicles repossessed."). 
42 See Martin, Public Opinion, supra note 11, at 263; Christopher L. Peterson, 
Usury Law, Payday Loans, and Statutory Sleight of Hand: Salience Distortion in 
American Credit Pricing Limits, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1110, 1111 (2008) [hereinafter 
Peterson, Usury Law]. 
43 Peterson, Usury Law, supra note 42, at 1113 ("Usury law, 'the oldest continuous 
form of commercial regulation,' dates back to the earliest recorded civilizations and 
continues to constrain payday lending in many American states."). 
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a good idea.44 Interest rate caps remained more or less in place 
throughout the United Sates until the Supreme Court's decision in 
Marquette National Bank v. First Omaha Service Corp.,45 in which 
"the Supreme Court was asked to decide which state's usury law 
applies when a national bank lends money to a consumer in 
another state--that of the consumer or that of the bank."46 When 
the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the bank's state rate 
applied, states began eliminating their usury caps in order to 
attract financial institutions to their states, with South Dakota 
and Delaware eliminating their caps first.47 The decision 
effectively deregulated state interest rate caps, allowing national 
banks headquartered in a state without usury caps to export their 
lack of an interest rate cap on consumers in any state.48 State 
lenders soon lobbied Congress for the same right, which Congress 
granted.49 Thereafter, banks could charge customers whatever 
rate they liked. 50 
44 Christopher L. Peterson, "Warning: Predatory Lender"-A Proposal for Candid 
Predatory Small Loan Ordinances, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 893, 931-32 (2012) 
[hereinafter Warning: Predatory Lender] (discussing Adam Smith's lack of confidence 
in the efficiency of consumer finance markets and that "[U]sury limits should be set 
'somewhat above . . .  the lowest market rate."'). 
46 Marquette Nat'l Bank v. First Omaha Serv. Corp. , 439 U.S. 299 (1978). 
46 See Martin, Public Opinion, supra note 11, at 264 n. 21 (quoting Professor Amy 
Schmitz) ("The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the National Bank Act 
("NBA") to allow national and state chartered banks and thrifts to 'export' favorable 
laws from their home states in order to circumvent less-favorable laws in other states 
where they do business . . . [meaning] that a bank chartered in Delaware may impose 
its interest rates on consumers in Colorado without worry about Colorado usury rate 
laws. Payday lenders use this to their advantage by affiliating with banks in states 
allowing for higher rates, and banks have started payday loan subsidiaries. Internet 
and out-of-state payday lenders seek to use the dormant commerce clause to challenge 
states' imposition of regulations on those who lend to their citizens."). 
47 See Peterson, Usury Law, supra note 42, at 1121-22. 
4s See id. at 1122. 
49 See id. 
60 See id. 
346 MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL 
C. Regulation of High-Cost Loans 
1. Federal Law on High-Cost Loans 
[VOL. 88:3 
No federal laws regulate the specific terms of consumer loans. 
However, the federal Truth in Lending Act applies to all loans, 51 
and the federal Electronic Fund Transfer Act,52 applies to online 
lending. 53 While we do have a federal agency in charge of 
regulating transparency and fairness in consumer financial 
transactions, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
(CFPB),64 the future of the CFPB is in a state of flux following the 
2016 presidential election.55 At the moment, the CFPB regulates 
banks, credit unions, securities firms, payday lenders, mortgage­
servicing operations, foreclosure relief services, debt collectors and 
other financial companies operating in the United States, but 
lacks authority to set interest rate caps on payday loans or any 
other credit product. 56 
Congress unquestionably has the power to set federal interest 
rate caps. In 2007, Congress passed the Military Lending Act 
61 Truth in Lending Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f (2006). 
62 Electronic Funds Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r (2006). 
63 Electronic Funds Transfer Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r (2006). 
64 See Jared Elosta, Dynamic Federalism and Consumer Financial Protectwn: How 
the Dodd-Frank Act Changes the Preemptwn Debate, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1273, 1273 (2011) 
(quoting 12 U.S.C.A. § 5511 ("[D]odd-Frank [Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act] . . .  created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ("CFPB" or 
"Bureau"), whose mission is to ensure 'that markets for consumer financial products 
and services are fair, transparent, and competitive."). See also H.R. 4173, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (July 21, 2010) (detailing the CFPB's creation was authorized 
by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the "Dodd­
Frank Act"), and its passage in 2010 was a legislative response to the financial crisis of 
2007-08 and the subsequent Great Recession). 
66 See Steve Vockrodt, CFPB Drops Kansas Payday Lending Case, Stoking Fears 
Trump is Backing Off the Industry, KANSAS CITY STAR (Jan 19, 2018), 
http://www.kansascity.com/news/politics-government1articlel96623824.html (Mick 
Mulvaney, the acting director of the CFPB, requested no funds from second quarter of 
the 2018 budget, and under his leadership, the agency dropped lawsuits against four 
Kansas payday lenders). See also Hannah Levintova, Consumer Protectwn Bureau 
Ends Investigation of Company that Donated to Leader's Campaigns, MOTHER JONES 
(Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2018/01/consumer-protection­
bureau-ends-investigation-of-company-that-donated-to-leaders-campaigns/ (in 2018, 
CFPB also dropped a four-year investigation of payday lender World Acceptance Corp.). 
66 Nathalie Martin, Regulating Payday Loans: Why This Should Make the CFPB's 
Short List, 2 HARV. Bus. L. REV. ONLINE 44, 48 (2011) [hereinafter Martin, Regulating 
Payday Loans] . 
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(MLA),57 which placed a 36% interest rate cap on consumer loans 
prohibited lenders from engaging in predatory practices toward 
active-duty military members and their dependent family 
members.58 Military leaders, deeply concerned about the effects of 
predatory lending on military readiness, realizing state 
lawmakers' inability or unwillingness to pass laws protecting the 
troops, focused their efforts on passing federal legislation. 59 In 
2006, the United States Department of Defense issued a report 
finding that predatory lending undermines military readiness, 
harms the morale of troops and their families, and adds to the cost 
of fielding an all volunteer [sic] fighting force."6° Congress noted 
that lenders were blatantly targeting the military by clustering in 
large numbers "near military bases" and using "military-sounding 
names."61 Congress also found that many military personnel 
lacked sophistication in financial matters and were easily taken 
advantage of. 62 While the original MLA contained many 
loopholes, which lenders quickly took advantage of, these 
loopholes have now been closed for the most part.63 
67 See 10 U.S.C. §987(a)-(b) (2016) ("A creditor who extends consumer credit to a 
covered member of the armed forces or a dependent of such a member . . .  may not 
impose an annual percentage rate of interest greater than 36 percent with respect to 
the consumer credit extended . . .  "); 32 C.F.R. §232.4(b) (2015) ("A creditor may not 
impose an [Military Annual Percentage Rate] greater than 36 percent in connection 
with an extension of consumer credit that is closed-end credit or in any billing cycle for 
open-end credit."). 
68 10 u.s.c. § 987(b) (2016). 
69 U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., REPORT ON PREDATORY LENDING PRACTICES DIRECTED AT 
MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THEIR DEPENDENTS, 9 (2006), 
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/Report_to_Congress_final.pdf. 
60 Id. 
61 See Graves & Peterson, supra note 9, at 698 (identifying the types of businesses 
targeting military personnel around military bases by conducting electronic searches); 
id. at 668-72 (discussing U.S. senators argued payday loans interfered with military 
preparedness by interfering with security clearances and also by making it so that 
soldiers cannot devote their attention to their jobs). This in turn negatively affects their 
performance. As explained by Republican Representative Walter Jones, Jr., '"[w]hen 
relatively unsophisticated borrowers are unable to readily repay a loan from these 
lenders, they can become consumed with worries over their debt and this undercuts 
their abilities to fulfill their military duties." 151 CONG. REC. El487-01 (July 14, 2005) 
(statement of Rep. Jones). 
62 Graves & Peterson, supra note 9, at 668-72. 
63 Carol Thompson, Loopholes Closed in Military Lending Act, VERITAS NEWS 
NETWORK (July 23, 2015), http://veritasnews.com/loopholes-closed-in-military-lending­
act/. 
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2. State Laws on High-Cost Lending 
Whether to have a usury cap is left to states and some states 
still cap interest on all consumer loans. 64 For example, most states 
along the eastern seaboard cap the amount of interest and fees a 
lender may charge for consumer loans in a way that is "undiluted" 
and "trim."66 In other words, no lender may charge more than 18% 
or 36% for a loan of any kind. These type of laws are referred 
herein as laws with "true caps." 
In most of the country, however, true caps are rare. More 
specifically, fifteen states and the District of Columbia either 
forbid payday lending or cap interest rates in a fashion that 
makes lending undesirable.66 The rest of the states have either no 
regulation of consumer loans, have regulations that affirmatively 
allow the high-cost products described above, or have piecemeal 
laws that apply to one or more of the various types of loans. 67 The 
resulting legislative patchwork keeps legislatures and consumer 
protections organizations busy around the clock, but has not 
resulted in any overall decrease in high-cost loans or in interest 
rates on such loans. To the contrary, the high-cost lending 
industry is growing exponentially, faster than any other part of 
the consumer credit sector.68 
64 Lauren K Saunders, Why 36%?:The History, Use, and Purpose of the36% Interest 
Rate Cap, NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, at 3, April 2013, available at 
https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-reports/why36pct.pdf (last accessed on February 23, 
2019). 
66 Peterson, Usury Law, supra note 42, at 111 7. 
66 Saunders, supra note 63, at 3. The following states ban or cap payday loans at 
36% or less: Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Georgia, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, 
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and West Virginia. 
67 Predatory Small-Dollar Lending Protections, PROSPERITY NOW SCORECARD 
(2016), http://scorecard.prosperitynow.org/2016/measure/predatory-small-dollar-
lending-protections. 
68 
United States Underbanked Financial Services Are a $78 Billion Marketplace 
That Encompasses Close to Two Dozen Products and Services Provided to Over 68 
Million Consumers, 2011 UNDERBANKED MARKET SIZING STUDY, CTR. FIN. SERV. 
INNOVATION (Nov. 2012), 
http://www.cfsinnovation.com/system/files/CFSI_2011_ U nderbanked_Market_Sizing_S 
tudy _November_2012.pdf (noting the Center for Financial Services Innovation ("CFSf') 
claims to be "[T]he nation's leading authority on financial services for underserved 
consumers. Through insights gained by producing original research; promoting cross­
sector collaboration; advising organizations and companies by offering specialized 
consulting services; shaping public policy; and investing in nonprofit organizations and 
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3. Local Laws on High-Cost Lending 
Some local communities, fed up with inaction or ineffective 
action to curb payday loan abuses, 69 are taking matters into their 
own hands. 70 Payday lending is a good subject for local reform. 71 
The harms of high-cost loans are felt first in local communities, 
where people borrow primarily to pay for day-to-day living 
expenses. 72 
In fact, "[l]ocal governments are often more motivated to fix 
problems like this than are states or the federal government," and 
local governments "are frequently more aware that these problems 
exist."73 Some see homelessness increase as result of payday loans 
and other consumer-adverse loans.74 Fueled by churches and other 
benevolent organizations, some city officials sadly watch while 
benevolence gifts from religious organizations and charities end 
up in the hands of high-cost lenders rather than grocery stores 
and landlords, a situation that concerns people of all political and 
religious persuasions.75 
start-ups, CFSI delivers a deeply interconnected suite of services benefiting 
underserved consumers."). See also Fahzy Abdul-Rahman, Small-Dollar Predatory 
Lending and Bad Loans: Guide G-260, N.M. ST. U., COOPERATIVE EXTENSION SERV., C .  
AGRIC. ,  CONSUMER & ENVTL SCI. 1 (Nov. 2012), http://aces.nmsu.edu/pubs/_g/G260.pdf 
("Between 1992 and 2000, the number of predatory lenders in New Mexico grew from 
one per 66,000 citizens to one for every 5,212 citizens."). 
69 See Martin, Public Opinwn, supra note 11, at 269-73 (discussing a wide 
variety of state and national polls that show broad public support for interest rate 
caps). See, e.g., Joshua Cooper, Reassessing Payday Lenders in the Wake of Their Most 
Negative Court Holding to Date, 18 J. CONSUMER & COMM. L. 15, 16 (2014) (describing 
a consumer advocacy group's placement of ads against payday lenders on "Shark 
Week," and comedian John Oliver's show "Last Week Tonight" as part of a growing 
national movement to curb payday lending); Ted Seeger, Texas Cities Respond to 
Payday Lending, 52 HOUSTON L. REV. 741, 753-58 (2014) (discussing failures of the 
Texas legislature to combat payday loan abuses); Martin & Mayer, supra note 2, at 
147-49 (providing examples of the options that local communities have when federal 
lawmakers do not address payday lending). 
70 Martin & Mayer, supra note 2, at 147-49 ("[D)iscuss[ing) the tools available to 
local communities when state or federal lawmakers fail to act on issues of community 
concern"). 
71 Peterson, Warning: Predatory Lender, supra note 44, at 932 (discussing local 
officials' perceived need to step in and fill the gap causes by lax state and federal 
payday loan regulations). 
72 See PEW CHARITABLE TRUST, Payday Lending, supra note 5. 
73 Martin & Mayer, supra note 2, at 149. 
14 See id. at 173 n.168. 
75 See id. at 162. 
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As a result of concerns of this nature, nearly 250 local 
municipalities nationwide were working to limit payday loan 
abuses as of the fall of 2016.76 While legal issues, such as 
preemption, can limit the effectiveness of local action77 since state 
law is supreme over local or municipal law on the same subject, 78 
the vast majority of local payday loan ordinances (other than mere 
licensing and registration) are zoning ordinances, which are 
strictly within the purview of local governments.79 
Although zoning ordinances are safe from preemption 
challenges, municipalities are by no means limited to zoning tools 
in regulating payday loans.80 Given that some states have not 
regulated payday loans at all, there is often broad capacity for 
municipalities to effect change beyond mere zoning.81 Cities and 
counties can pass licensing and registration regulations, 
moratoria and permanent bans on new loan establishments, and 
permit regulations as well as caps on the total number of payday 
lenders within a municipality or county through traditional zoning 
powers. 
Cities and counties can also limit the proximity of lenders in 
relation to one another and to other uses, and they can set good 
neighbor polices by setting limits on hours of operation and 
requiring certain lighting and signage.82 Municipalities may also 
76 Telephonic interview with Steven Graves, February 6, 2018. (Professor Graves 
keeps a database of all local ordinances as they are passed.). 
77 The federal preemption doctrine comes from the U.S. Constitution. See U.S. 
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (''This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall 
be made in Pursuance thereof . . .  shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the 
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of 
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding"). 
78 Griffith et al., supra note 21, at 37. 
79 See id. at 17-36. 
80 See id. at 12 (summarizing the many ways in which municipalities have 
regulated payday lending, including moratoria on new payday lending while studying 
the issue, permanent moratoria, limits on density and distance, and special permit 
requirements, among others). 
81 Other jurisdictions regulate piecemeal, leaving many opportunities for local 
governments to fill in the blanks. For an excellent summary of these laws across the 
Nation as of 2010, see NAT'L CONSUMER L. CTR., SMALL DOLLAR LOAN PRODUCT 
SCORECARD-UPDATED (May 2010), http://consumersunion.org/pdf/Scorecard-5-12-
10.PDF. 
82 See, e.g. , MESA, ARIZ., ZONING ORDINANCE § 11-6-3 (July 4, 2018) (specifying that 
to receive a permit, a non-chartered financial institution must obtain any required 
state licenses, meet the separation requirements, submit documentation showing that 
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require distribution of information about local alternatives to 
payday loans.83 Finally, "municipalities can adopt D resolution[s 
that] support state legislative efforts to curb the damaging effects 
of payday lending on communities."84 In other words, local 
governments can educate state legislatures about what ordinary 
citizens actually want, which in effect shames state legislators 
who are turning a blind eye to the problem. Local payday loan 
ordinances were used very successfully for this purpose in Oregon, 
after which the state regulated payday lenders and caused the 
number of payday loan storefronts to drop from 329 to 81 in only 
one year.85 
II. SOCIO-GEOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND: BIFURCATED FINANCIAL 
MARKETS, DISTANCE DECAY THEORY, AND LOCALIZATION 
ECONOMIES 
A. Bifurcated U.S. Financial Markets: How the 
Other Half Banks 
When it comes to interest rates, US financial markets are 
currently bifurcated into two alternate systems owing to two 
distinct socio-economic realities in America. The first is the 
mainstream financial system that serves middle- and upper­
income households. 86 A person in this segment, using traditional 
financial services such as banks, might pay 10-18% on a short­
term bank loan, 87 an average of 14-16% for a loan taken out on a 
the site would be in compliance with all landscaping, parking, signage, and design 
regulations, and demonstrate that it would be compatible with surrounding uses and 
consistent with the general plan). 
83 See Memorandum from James Zahradka, Supervising Attorney, Public Interest 
Law Firm, Law Foundation of Silicon Valley, to City of Morgan Hill, 7 (Oct. 1, 2014), 
available at http://www.morgan-hill.ca.gov/DocumentCenterNiew/14214/42-
Supplement-4 ?bidld=. 
84 Martin & Mayer, supra note 2, at 153. 
86 Bill Graves, Pay Days Loans in Oregon, NORTHWEST DEBT RELIEF LAW FIRM 
(July 6, 2008), https://nwdrlf.com/pay-days-loans-in-oregon/. 
86 Mehrsa Baradaran, How the Poor Got Cut Out of Banking, 62 EMORY L.J 483, 
483 (2013). 
67 Finance Rate on Personal Loans at Commercial Banks, ECONOMIC RESEARCH 
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS (FRED), available at Interest Rates, ECONOMIC 
RESEARCH FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS, at 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TERMCBCCALLNS, (last visited February 24, 2019). 
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credit card, or 4-5% for a fixed rate 30-year real estate mortgage 
loan.88 In contrast, low-moderate-income individuals exist in a 
post-Marquette financial system in which they borrow at rates of 
300-1000% or more. 89 These two socio-economic realities could not 
be more disparate. One would expect the disparity in interest 
rates to reflect completely different universes, or at a minimum, 
different countries. Both universes thrive in the U.S. with little in 
between. 
How high are usage rates for high-cost loan products? In 
2013, 39. 3 % of all U.S. households used at least one of the 
following types of alternative financial products: payday loans, 
installment loans, title loans, pawn shops, refund anticipation 
loans, rent-to-own services, non-bank money orders, non-bank 
check cashing and non-bank remittances.90 Not surprisingly, 
people who use traditional banks use alternative financial 
products less frequently. More specifically, unbanked households 
use alternative financial services and products at the rate of 
63.2% while households with traditional bank relationships use 
these products just 21. 7% in 2013.91 
People use alternative financial services for a variety of 
reasons, but they use alternative financial services most 
frequently for recurring basic consumption needs and 
convenience92-not emergencies.93 This use, despite the huge 
88 See id. 
89 See Martin, supra notes 32-41 and accompanying text. 
90 See e.g., Marianne Bertrand, Sendhil Mullainathan, & Eldar Shafir, Behavioral 
Eonomics and Marketing in Aid of Decision Making Among the Poor, 25 J.PuB. POL 'y & 
MARKETING 8 (2006); Jane Cover, Amy F. Spring, & Rachel G. Kleit, Minorities on the 
Margins? The Spatial Organization of Fringe Banking Services, 33 J. URB. AFF. 317, 
318 (2011); Baradaran, supra note 84; Fowler et al., supra note 22, at 696; Ian M. 
Dunham & Alec. Foster, Proximate Landscapes of Economic Inclusion in Southeastern 
Pennsylvania, 67 PROF. GEOGRAPHER 132, 142 (2015). 
91 2017 FDIC National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households, 
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, at 15 (Oct. 2018), available at 
https://www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey/201 7/2017 appendix.pd£. 
92 Amanda Logan & Christian E. Weller, Who Borrows From Payday Lenders? An 
Analysis of Newly Available Data, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 3, 11 (2009), available at 
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/issues/2009/03/pdf/payday _lending 
.pdf. 
93 Gregory Elliehausen & Edward C. Lawrence, Payday Advance Credit in 
America· An Analysis of Consumer Demand, CREDIT RESEARCH CTR. 28, 29 (2001), 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.200. 77 40&rep=ep l&type=pdf 
(claiming that 51% of payday borrowers made $25,000 - $50,000 a year and that an 
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costs, can be explained by lack of financial literacy,94 convenience 
and friendliness of personnel in the lender's stores,95 high costs of 
and dissatisfaction with financial products and services that the 
mainstream banks provide and mistrust of mainstream banks, 96 
credit constraints, 97and diminished cognitive capacity due to 
extreme financial distress. 9s 
Most of the previous research on the spatial distribution of 
alternative financial service providers has sought to determine 
whether alternative financial service providers target at-risk and 
vulnerable communities, including those with higher 
alarming 77% of the payday loan users made over $25,000). Less than 72% of the 
general population made an income this high three years later, according to Census 
data. See Household Income in the United States, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Household_income_in_the_ U nited_States (showing by 
chart that 28.22% of the general population made $25,000 or less in 2003, meaning 
that only 71.88% made more than $25,000 in 2003, three years after these gentlemen 
gathered their data. Could the payday loan users actually be better off financially than 
the population as a whole? This makes little sense.). 
94 Marianne Bertrand & Adair Morse, Information Disclosure, Cognitive Biases, 
and Payday Borrowing, 66 J. FIN. 1865, 1876-78 (201 1); Annamaria Lusardi & Carlo de 
Bassa Scheresberg, Financial Literacy and High-Cost Borrowing in the United States 
21-22 (NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RES., Working Paper No. 18969, April 2013), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w18969. 
96 Ernesto Longa & Nathalie Martin, High-Interest Loans and Class: Do Payday 
and Title Loans Really Serve the Middle Class?, 24 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 524, 526 
(2012). 
96 See Michael S. Barr & Rebecca M. Blank, Savings, Assets, Credit, and Banking 
Among Low-Income Households: Introduction and Overview, in INSUFFICIENT FuNDs: 
SAVINGS, AsSETS, CREDIT, AND BANKING AMONG LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS 1,  3-5 
(RUSSELL SAGE FOUNDATION 2008); Michael S. Barr, No SLACK: THE FINANCIAL LIVES 
OF Low-INCOME AMERICAN 23-24 (BROOKINGS INSTITUTION PRESS 2012);  see generally 
John P. Caskey, FRINGE BANKING: CHECK-CASHING OUTLETS, PAWNSHOPS, AND THE 
POOR (RUSSELL SAGE FOUNDATION 1984); 
97 See, e.g., Neil Bhutta, Paige M. Skiba, & Jeremy Tobacman, Payday Loan 
Choices and Consequences, 47 J. MONEY, CREDIT, AND BANKING 223 (2015); Lisa Servon 
& Antonieta Castro-Cosio, Reframing the Debate About Financial Inclusion: Evidence 
from an Up Close View of Alternative Financial Services, WASHINGTON, DC: BOARD OF 
GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, ECONOMIC MOBILITY CONFERENCE, 
2015, 
https://www.stlouisfed.org/-/media/Files/PDFs/Community%20Development/Econ%20 
Mobility/Sessions/ServonPaper508.pdf. 
98 Sendhil Mullainathan & Eldar Shafir, Savings Policy and Decision-Making in 
Low-Income Households, in INSUFFICIENT FUNDS: SAVINGS, ASSETS, CREDIT AND 
BANKING AMONG Low-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS 121, 145 (RUSSELL SAGE FOUNDATION 
2011). 
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concentrations of low-income individuals and minorities.99 This 
research, bivariate or multivariate correlational in nature, has 
determined that the alternative financial services industry is more 
concentrated in low- to moderate-income communities but not in 
the most impoverished areas.100 Most of these studies hint at, but 
do not actually prove, that low- to moderate-income consumers use 
the alternative financial service industry more often when those 
services are more densely located in their communities. 1°1 
When researchers have tried to determine whether 
alternative financial service providers are filling a void in the 
market left by more traditional service providers, t�e results have 
been inconclusive. Some studies have found that alternative 
financial service providers are more likely to be located in areas 
where residents are underserved by traditional banks.102 Other 
studies found that the alternative financial service providers 
typically coexist with traditional banks. 103 One study found that 
whether or not alternative financial service providers coexist with 
traditional banks depends on location. 104 Another study, which 
used Euclidian distance from each census tract to the nearest 
check cashing provider and bank location in southeastern 
Pennsylvania, concluded that alternative financial service 
providers and traditional banks normally serve communities of 
different socioeconomic characteristics.105 
More recent research sheds light on how the density of 
alternative financial service providers and state regulation of 
payday lending are related to consumer use of alternative 
99 Regarding minorities, see Graves, Landscapes, supra note 12, at 304; Temkin & 
Sawyer, supra note 12, at 1-2; Tony Smith, Marvin M. Smith, & John Wackes, 
Alternative Financial Service Providers and the Spatial Void Hypothesis, 38 REGIONAL 
SCI. & URB. ECON. 205, 219-23 (2008); Alice Gallmeyer & Wade T. Roberts, Payday 
Lenders and Economically Distressed Communities: A Spatial Analysis of Financial 
Predation, 46 Soc. SCI. J. 521, 525-29 (2009); Cover, Spring, & Kleit, supra note 88, at 
322-25 (2011); Neil Bhutta, Payday Loans and Consumer Financial Health, 47 J. 
BANKING & FIN. 230, 242 (2014); Fowler et al., supra note 22, at 694-99; Dunham & 
Foster, supra note 88, at 135-40 (2015). 
100 T. Smith, M. Smith, & Wackes, supra note 97, at 219, 223. 
101 See id at 223. 
102 See id. 
103 Temkin & Sawyer, supra note 12, at 3; Fowler et.al, supra note 22, at 688, 690. 
104 Cover, Spring, & Kleit, supra note 88, at 339-41. 
105 Dunham & Foster, supra note 88, at 136-40. 
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· financial service providers. 106 Using the 2012 National Financial 
Capability Study and restricted-use zip code files, scholars 
Friedline and Kepple measured community density as the total 
number of "auto title loans, payday loans, tax refunds, pawnshops, 
or rent-to-own stores."107 They then measured alternative 
financial services loan usage and found that the higher the 
density of alternative financial service providers, the more 
consumers used the loans. 108 
To date, no empirical study has investigated how far 
consumers need to travel to access the nearest alternative 
financial service provider, or whether the density of alternative 
financial service providers within consumers' communities are 
associated with consumers' use of alternative financial service. 
Our study makes use of point addresses of consumers' residence 
and payday lenders to precisely and accurately measure 
accessibility in Euclidian distance. The methodology we use here 
is an improvement over that used in previous studies. Our study 
uses point addresses for its calculations. Additionally, the analysis 
is performed using Euclidian distance, since consumers who have 
zero lenders in their zip code or census tract may still live among 
many payday lenders. We further improved on past methodologies 
by including all payday lenders present just outside of the study 
area of our research. 109 By controlling for proximity and density of 
106 See Terri Friedline & Nancy Kepple, Does Community Access to Alternative 
Financial Services Relate to Individuals' Use of These Services ? Beyond Individual 
Explanations, 40 J. CONSUMER POL'Y 51, 59-61 (2017). 
107 See id. at 58. 
108 See id. at 66, 68. These authors found an increase in use of alternative financial 
services among consumers with incomes at or greater than $15,000 ("modest- and 
highest-income" groups), and that higher density of alternative financial service 
providers was associated with "chronic use" of these lenders among consumers with 
incomes less than $15,000 ("lowest-income" group). The study also found that state 
prohibition of payday lenders provided protection for modest- and highest-income 
consumers, but not so much for low-income consumers. See generally id. 
109 Stan Openshaw, Developing GIS-Relevant Zone-Based Spatial Analysis Methods, 
in PAUL LONGLEY AND MICHAEL BATTY, SPATIAL ANALYSIS: MODELLING IN A GIS 
ENVIRONMENT 55-73 (WILEY 1996). This minimized the modifiable areal unit problem, 
caused by eliminating store locations that are within the statistically significant 
distance of a consumer because they fall just outside an artificial boundary. Focusing 
on a locality, the data utilized for this study contains no heterogeneity of AFS 
regulations, compositions of urban/rural, and zoning laws that would have affected 
consumers' use of AFS. See id. 
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traditional banks/credit unions, as well as individual-level 
financial and household characteristics, the present study fills the 
gap in the existing research on understanding how accessibility 
influences payday loan use. 110 
B. Distance Decay Theory and Localization Economies: Why 
Payday Loans in the Neighborhood Matter in Theory 
1 .  Distance Decay Theory 
While it is intuitively understood that greater distance from a 
location limits our physical interaction with that location, this 
concept is described theoretically as distance decay or sometimes 
alternatively as the gravity model. Distance decay theory notes the 
decline in interaction between places, ethnic groups, or any other 
phenomena of interest as the distance between them increases. 111  
Distance decay is often described using geographer Waldo Tobler's 
first law of geography, namely that "everything is related to 
everything else, but near things are more related than distant 
things."112 While even Tobler admits that things are not always 
this simple,1 13 this maxim provides a meaningful starting point. 
Thus, the spatial distribution of services (i.e., accessibility), along 
with other individual factors, such as transportation availability, 
ability to weigh multiple alternatives, and personal preference, 
has a measurable effect on consumer use of those services. 
Distance decay models have been used to examine a broad array of 
human problems, including obesity and supermarket 
availability, 114 criminal behavior and crime location, 115 and health 
no See id. 
111 See generally AS. Fotheringham, Spatial Structure and Distance-Decay 
Parameters, 7 1  ANNALS OF THE Ass'N OF AM. GEOGRAPHERS 426 (1981). 
u2 Tobler, supra note 1, at 236. 
n3 See id. at 234; see also Daniel Z. Sui, Tobler's First Law of Geography: A Big Idea 
for a Small World?, 94 ANNALS OF THE ASS'N OF AM. GEOGRAPHERS 269, 269 (2004). 
n• Paul L. Robinson et al., Does Distance Decay Modelling of Supermarket 
Accessibility Predict Fruit and Vegetable Intake by Individuals in a Large Metropolitan 
Area?, 24 J. HEALTH CARE FOR THE POOR & UNDERSERVED, 172, 173 (2013). 
116 Sun Li ping, Yan Shaohong, Peng Y amian, & Yang Aimin, Criminal Incident 
Predictwn Based on Geographical Profile, 6 J. CHEMICAL & PHARMACEUTICAL RES. 1, 
1-7 (2014), available at http://jocpr.com/vol6-iss3-2014/JCPR-2014-6-3-1-7.pdf. 
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disparities and availability of healthcare facilities.116 Distance 
decay theory suggests that consumers may be more likely to take 
out a payday loan if there was a lender nearby due to the higher 
frequency of interaction between the business and the consumer. 
2. Density and Localization Economies 
Localization economies refers to the grouping of certain types 
of businesses near each other for the benefit of both the supply 
and demand sides of the equation. Clustering certain activities (in 
this case payday loan stores) may decrease the costs of labor and 
materials.117 For some businesses, being grouped together in 
particular locations allows for a supply of suitable employees. 
Additionally, nearness lowers the cost of infrastructure such as 
telecommunications, parking lots, security, and the like. For 
consumers, grouping these businesses together provides easier 
access to multiple locations along with cheaper transportation 
costs if they wish to compare rates or visit more than one location. 
The assumption is that separating these stores will make it more 
expensive and more difficult for consumers to locate and utilize 
them. 
Combining these concepts, one could assume that a consumer 
would be more likely to make use of a payday loan if there was a 
lender in near proximity to his or her home and if there are 
convenient ways to use more than one location for comparison. 
While localization economies may provide some benefits for 
businesses and consumers, the high density of payday loan stores 
and visible marketing also provides behavioral cues that 
encourage use of alternative financial services. 118 In other words, 
having a large number of lenders normalizes the practice of 
charging 300- 1,000% interest. 
Since considering the distance decay and localization 
economies theories, our study was guided by two hypotheses. 
116 Zoe M. McLaren, Cally Ardington, & Murray Leibbrandt, Distance Decay and 
Persistent Health Care Dispariti,es in South Africa, 14 BMC HEALTH SERVS. RES. 1, 8 
(2014). 
117 See generally GORDON L. CLARK, MARYANN P. FELDMAN, MERIC S. GERTLER, & 
DARIUSZ WOJCIK, THE NEW OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY 21-23 
(OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 2018). 
118 See generally Bertrand, Mullainathan, & Shafir, supra note 88. 
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First, increases in distance of payday lenders from the consumers' 
residences should be associated with a decreased likelihood of 
payday loan use. Second, increases in density of payday lenders 
should be associated with an increased likelihood of payday loan 
use. Below, we describe how we tested these working hypotheses. 
Ill. STUDY METHODOLOGY 
This part describes the methodology for our study, some of 
the study limitations, as well as the results of our study. 
A. Sources of Data 
This study utilized data collected from 289 Chapter 7 
Bankruptcy filers who filed for bankruptcy in June 2005 in the 
Middle District (i.e., Baton Rouge, Louisiana) United States 
Bankruptcy Court. The bankruptcy filers' home addresses, as well 
as data on individual-level characteristics, were furnished in the 
bankruptcy data. Because not all of the 289 addresses could be 
retrieved or correctly geocoded in the G IS program, a subset of the 
sample comprised of 172 households were included in the final 
analyses. The only known available list of the population of U.S. 
payday lender addresses, which was compiled in the year 2007, 
was furnished by a geographer who has studied payday lending 
neighbor hoods. 11e 
B. Description of Baton Rouge 
Our study was conducted in Louisiana, which does not limit 
interest rate caps. As background, Louisiana has the second 
highest rate (13.9 %) of unbanked and the seventh highest rate 
119 Telephonic Interview with Steven Graves, June 2011. The authors were unable 
to locate a list of the population of payday lender addresses for the year 2006. To 
maintain consistency with the reference year (2007) of the list of payday lender 
addresses, all addresses of regional banks and credit union locations, compiled for the 
year 2007, for community-level control variables were obtained from the FDIC 
Summary of Deposits (SOD) database and the Louisiana Corporate Credit Union 
database. See Baton Rouge Credit Union Finder, CUWEB.ORG, available at 
http://www.cuweb.org/cu_finder .htm#laf, 
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(24.5 %) of underbanked population in the United States. 120 
Louisiana also has the ninth highest rate (7. 1 %, compared to the 
national average of 4.7 %) of consumers who have ever used 
payday loans.121 We collected our data in the Baton Rouge 
metropolitan area, which has similar demographic characteristics 
to the rest of the state.122 
Figure 1 illustrates the agglomeration of payday lender 
locations in the Baton Rouge metropolitan area (hereafter "Baton 
Rouge") with respect to payday loan consumers in the sample. The 
progressively darker areas show a progressively heavier 
concentration of payday loan establishments. The red dots are the 
homes of the consumers in our sample. Through Figure 1, we can 
see the strong relationship between the home addresses . of the 
bankruptcy debtors in our sample and the concentrations of 
payday loan availability. The darker color zip code areas, which 
show a higher concentration of payday lenders, correlate with the 
higher concentration of consumers' homes. 
120 2017 FDIC National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households, 
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, at 15 (Oct. 2018), available at 
https://www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey/2017/2017appendix.pdf. 
121 Addendum to thte 2011 FDIC National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked 
Households, FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, (June 2013), available at 
https: I lwww.fdic.gov I householdsurvey I 2013_afsaddendum_web.pdf. 
122 See CORP. FOR ENTERPRISE DEV., The Most Unbanked Places in America (2011), 
https://prosperitynow.org/blog/most-unbanked-places-america. Additionally, the FDIC's 
National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households found that, in 2013, 7. 7% 
of U.S. households are unbanked. However, 20.6% of African Americans, 17.9% of 
Latinos, and 15.0% of Others (i.e., all remaining racial-ethnic groups) are unbanked. In 
addition, the unbanked are more likely to be unmarried, have incomes of less than 
$30,000, less than a high school education, and a foreign-born Spanish speaker than 
the U.S. population as a whole. See 201 7 FDIC National Survey of Unbanked and 
Underbanked Households, supra note 118. 
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C. Payday Loan Consumers and Payday Lender Locations in 
the Baton Rouge Metropolitan Area 
1. Description of the Variables 
In our study, we chose payday loan use as our dependent 
variable. We used the Public Access to Court Electronic Records 
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(PACER) system to search through the bankruptcy debtor's court 
disclosures (specifically their schedules of assets and liabilities) to 
find out if they had listed at least one payday loan among their 
debts. We identified payday loan debts in the bankruptcy files by 
correlating the names of creditors with those payday loan lenders 
licensed by the state Office of Financial Institutions and/or 
through the creditor's names, such as those including the terms 
payday loan, payday lender, or check lender in the creditor name. 
The first major independent variable we used was distance. 
More specifically, we used the Euclidean distance or straight-line 
distance in miles between the bankruptcy filers' home addresses 
and the nearest payday lender. The second major independent 
variable we used was density of payday loan stores, which we 
measured by determining the number of payday lenders within a 
1.5-mile radius of the bankruptcy filers' home addresses. To 
compute the distance and density of payday lenders and their 
proximity to the sample, the bankruptcy filers' home addresses 
and a list of licensed payday lenders were geocoded (i.e. ,  
pinpointed) on a map of the locality using a program called 
ArcGIS Desktop. 123 
For the distance variable, we computed the Euclidean 
distance in miles to ascertain the point-to-point distance between 
the bankruptcy filers' home addresses and the nearest payday 
lender. In order to make sure we chose the right distance for 
measuring density, we placed the bankruptcy filers' home address 
as the center of the circle for each debtor and then engaged in a 
series of sensitivity tests to determine which increment of the 
density-within-quarter-mile radius variable best modeled the 
effect of density on the dependent variable. We tested 0.25 miles, 
0.5 miles, and 0.75 miles, increasing incrementally by 0.25 miles 
up to a maximum of 2.5 miles. We ultimately selected a radius of 
1.5 miles as the independent variable because, of all of the density 
independent variables, the model with this density-within-a-1.5 
mile radius exhibited the highest model goodness-of-fit statistics 
and independent variable t-test statistics we tested. 
We built several statistical controls into our model, a series of 
theoretically and empirically relevant community and individual-
123 We used release 10.3.1 of the program. See http://desktop.arcgis.com/en/. 
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level variables. We measured the four community-level control 
variables-bank distance, bank density, credit union distance, and 
credit union density-in a manner consistent with the payday 
lender distance and density variables. 124 
Payday loan borrowers tend to be renters rather than 
homeowners, single, and earn low incomes. 125 
Therefore, dichotomous individual-level control variables 
included the presence of homeownership and the status of being 
married. Two continuous individual-level control variables 
included in the analyses were the number of children present in 
the bankruptcy filers' households and the income-to-needs ratios 
(i.e., income divided by poverty threshold). 
D. Statistical Strategy 
Using Stata/SE 14. 1 software to analyze the data, we created 
descriptive statistics for all of the variables. We created 
frequencies and percentages for the dichotomous variables and 
means and standard deviations for the continuous variables. We 
used logistic regression to analyze the relationship between the 
distance and density of payday lenders and payday loan use, 
holding all else constant. We reported parameter estimates as 
odds ratios, and we found statistical significance by one-tailed 
tests of statistical significance levels less than an alpha-level of 
0.05. We conducted Stata post-estimation to generate and graph 
the predicted probabilities of payday loan use for each bankruptcy 
filer for their values of payday distance, holding the other 
variables constant. We also conducted this same post-estimation 
process for the payday density variable. 
124 Fowler et al., supra note 22, at 696. These bank and credit union variables were 
separately entered because at least one study found that payday lenders were more 
likely to be present "in counties that also have more traditional banks (but not more 
credit unions)." Id. 
126 Logan & Weller, supra note 90, at 1. 
2019) NEFARIOUS NEIGHBORS 
Table 1: 
Descriptive Statistics of the Subset of the Sample in the Analyses (n = 1 72) 
Variables 
Payday Loan Use 
Payday Distance 
(Miles) 
Payday Density 
(Within 1 .5 Mile Radius) 
Bank Distance 
(Miles) 
Bank Density 
(1.5 Mile Radius) 
Credit Union Distance 
(Miles) 
Credit Union Density 
(Within 1 .5 Mile Radius) 
Home Ownership 
n (%) 
32 (18.60) 
131 (76. 16) 
M (SD) 
2.46 (2.71) 
3.31 (3.85) 
3.35 (3.32) 
1 .34 (1 .90) 
7.00 (16.42) 
0.64 (1.20) 
363 
Income 
$34,005.49 ($27,224.22) 
$29, 184.00* 
Married 
Children 
76 (44. 19) 
0.76 (1.07) 
* Denotes median value for non-normally distributed variables. 
IV. STUDY RESULTS 
A. Descriptive Results 
Table 1 contains our descriptive statistics of the subset of 
bankruptcy filer sample whose home addresses were geocoded. Of 
the subset of 1 72 bankruptcy filers in the empirical analyses, 32 
(18.60 %) had used payday loans. The sample lived within a mean 
of 2 .46 (SD = 2. 71) miles of the nearest payday lender and had a 
mean of 3.31 (SD = 3.85) payday lenders within a 1.5-mile radius 
of their home addresses. The bankruptcy filers lived within a 
mean of 3.35 (SD = 3.32) miles of the nearest bank and had a 
mean of 1.34 (SD = 1.90) banks within a 1.5-mile radius of their 
home addresses. The sample also lived within a mean of 7.00 (SD 
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= 16.42) miles of the nearest credit union and had a mean of 0.64 
(SD = 1 .20) credit unions with a 1 .5-mile radius of their home 
addresses. In terms of the individual-level control variables, three­
quarters of the sample (n = 131, 76. 16 %) owned a home. The 
sample's mean and median incomes were $34,005.49 (SD = 
$27,224.22) and $29, 184.00, respectively. A little over two-fifths (n 
= 76, 44. 19 percent) of the bankruptcy filers were married, and in 
terms of children, the sample had a mean of 0.76 (SD = 1 .07) 
children. 
Table 2 
Logistic Regression Results 
Variables OR z 
Payday Distance 0.73* -1 .66 
Payday Density 1. 15** 2.49 
Bank Distance 1.01 0.05 
Bank Density 0.96 -0.32 
Credit Union Distance 0.99 -0.31 
Credit Union Density 0. 79 - 1. 18  
Homeownership 0.25** -2.62 
Married 1.44 0.70 
Children 1.60* 2.20 
Income-to-Needs Ratio 1.05 0.37 
x2 = 23.84** (p = 0.008) 
*p < .05. **p < .01 
C. Quantitative Empirical Results 
Table 2 presents results of logistic regression. The major 
independent variables and a couple of control variables 
significantly predicted payday loan use in the distance and density 
concurrent model, as evidenced by a significant chi-square 
statistic (x.2 = 23.84, p < 0.01,  Pseudo R2 = 0.14). We found that an 
increase in distance of payday lenders from the bankruptcy filers' 
home addresses was associated with a decreased likelihood of 
payday loan use (Odds Ratio [OR] = 0.73, z = - 1.66, p < 0.05). We 
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further found that increases in density of payday lenders within 
1.5 miles of the bankruptcy filers' home addresses were associated 
with an increased likelihood of payday loan use (OR = 1.15, z = 
2.49, p < 0.01). 
Our study dataset matched up consistently with many prior 
studies on homeownership (OR = 0.25, z = -2.62, p < 0.01), which 
significantly predicted decreases in the likelihood of payday loan 
use, while increases in the number of children (OR = 1.60, z = 
2.20, p < 0.05) significantly predicted increases in the likelihood of 
payday loan use. The remainder of the control variables, bank 
density, bank distance, credit union density, and credit umon 
distance did not significantly predict payday loan use. 126 
126 Bank distance (OR = 1.01, z = 0.05), bank density (OR = 0.96, z = -0.32), credit 
union distance (OR = 0.99, z = -0.31), credit union density (OR = 0.79, z = -1.18), 
marital status (OR = 1.44, z = 0.70), and income-to-needs ratios (OR = 1.05, z = 0.37). 
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D. The Distance Decay Function 
We generated two graphs using the Stata post-estimation 
functions. Figure 2, the Distance Decay Function, demonstrated 
that increases in payday distance are associated with decreases in 
the predicted probability of payday loan use when holding all 
other variables constant. The predicted probability of payday loan 
use for filers who live close to payday lenders was approximately 
0.24.127 Figure 3 shows the Localization Economies Function. 
More specifically, Figure 3 shows that increases in payday density 
are associated with increases in the predicted probability of 
payday loan use. The predicted probability of payday loan use for 
127 This probability drops to about 0.18 at one-mile from the nearest payday lender 
and decreases at a smaller rate for each mile increase in distance thereafter. 
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filers who live within communities dense with payday lenders 
increases almost linearly for each unit increase in payday density. 
Figure 3 
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Several scholars have noted the way in which low- and 
moderate -income households use alternative financial services 
creates an equity or environmental justice issue. 128 This results 
from a lack of access to better alternatives at traditional banking 
institutions. 129 In an attempt to address the geographically 
uneven distribution of alternative financial services, previous 
128 Timothy Bates & Constance R. Dunham, Introduction to Focus Issue: Use of 
Financial Services by Low-Income Households, 17 ECON. DEV. Q. 3, 6 (2003). 
129 See id. 
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studies have attempted to answer whether the alternative 
financial services industry strategically locates its storefronts in 
neighborhoods with consumers predominantly of a lower 
socioeconomic status and minority composition for the particular 
purpose of filling the void after traditional banks have left. 
F. Study Limitations 
While this is the first study that examined the association 
between the distance and density of payday lenders and consumer 
use of payday loans using point addresses and controlling for 
accessibility of mainstream banks and credit unions, this study 
has several limitations. First, this study used non-representative 
cross-sectional data and cannot establish causality. While the 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy filers' data offers a unique advantage of 
furnishing point addresses of filers with detailed accounts of AFS 
use, the data may have contained a more socioeconomically 
disadvantaged segment of population; particularly given that 
bankruptcy debtors have more income volatility than average 
Americans. Bankruptcy debtors also tend to be middle-class 
rather than the working poor, a fact that may make up for this 
income volatility in the sample. 
Furthermore, 40% of the sample had missing addresses and 
were more likely to be more disadvantaged with lower incomes 
and higher use of payday loans. Second, due to a small sample 
size, the authors of this study could not conduct group analyses 
based on income as Friedline and Kepple had accomplished in 
their study.13° Future studies with a larger sample size may 
consider analyzing data on different income groups. Third, while it 
is common to utilize different data sources of different reference 
years, due to limited data availability,131 this study used consumer 
data of 2005 as compared to addresses of payday lenders and 
banks and credit unions of 2007. Thus, bias could have been 
introduced based on the extent to which the location of consumers, 
payday lenders, and banks and credit unions changed between 
2005 and 2007. Fourth, due to the unavailability of data, this 
study did not control for other unobserved variables, such as age, 
13° Friedline & Kepple, supra note 104, at 58. 
131 Fowler et al., supra note 22, at 696-97. 
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race, gender, financial literacy, unexpected hardships, and comfort 
level with other barriers to mainstream banks, which may have 
affected payday loan use. The authors attempted to overcome 
some of the data limitations in the following ways. While federal 
bankruptcy courts do not require filers to enter gender when 
filing, the authors used filers' names to create a gender variable. 
The inclusion of a gender variable in the models neither improved 
model fit nor was it a significant factor to determine payday loan 
use. The authors additionally explored how the inclusion of 
homeownership may have served as a proxy for some of the 
missing variables, (e.g., race and ethnicity) as evidenced by U.S. 
census data which revealed clear differences in homeownership 
rates by race and ethnicity.132 
G. Other Study Implications on Related Subjects 
As demonstrated in this study, homeownership was 
significantly related to decreases in the likelihood of payday loan 
use. This finding demonstrated that homeownership was a 
protective factor against payday loan use, which was consistent 
with previous studies.133 Policymakers should look to implement 
policies that build consumers' financial asset portfolios, encourage 
the purchase of homes and the development of other financial 
assets, such as bank savings accounts, and to curb the use of 
costly alternative financial services such as payday loans.134 
It is worthwhile to consider two findings on the presence of 
children and the accessibility of traditional banks and credit 
unions. First, findings showed that increases in the number of 
children were associated with increases in the likelihood of payday 
loan use. There appears to be added costs for the added number of 
children that is not captured by income-to-needs ratio (i.e . ,  income 
divided by poverty thresholds). For instance, a household may 
132 Quarterly Residential Vacancies and Homeownership, First Quarter 201 7, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU (2017), https://www.census.gov/housing/hvs/files/qtrl 17/Ql 17press.pdf 
188 Younghee Lim et al., The Role of Middle-Class Status in Payday Loan 
Borrowing: A Multivariate Approach, 59 Soc. WORK 329, 335 (2014). 
134 See generally Julie Birkenmaier & Sabrina Watson Tyuse, Affordable Financial 
Services and Credit for the Poor: The Foundation of Asset Building, 13 J. COMMUNITY 
PRAC. 69 (2005); Sherraden et al., FIN. CAPABILITY AND AsSET DEV.: RES., EDUC., POL'Y, 
& PRAC. 3-43 (Oxford University Press 2013). 
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have enough income to escape extreme material hardship in the 
context of federally-defined poverty. Nevertheless, the household 
may not have enough to cover other expenses incurred by 
unexpected medical and other needs due to financial 
vulnerability.135 
Second, accessibility of traditional banks and credit unions 
indicated by distance and density of those establishments was not 
a significant factor in determining payday loan use. It may be that 
the low- to moderate-income consumers in the study are extremely 
economically disadvantaged, and they have low credit scores or no 
credit history to take advantage of banks and credit union 
accessibility. It also may be that low- to moderate-income 
consumers have no incentives to use bank products because of 
negative prior experiences with bank products and personnel, 
and/or they lack knowledge of the affordable products offered by 
community-based credit unions. Future research should further 
investigate what the accessibility of traditional banks and credit 
unions means for low- to moderate-income consumers. 
CONCLUSION 
Access to payday loans increases the likelihood of using 
payday loans. Snowballing payday loan debt can strip financially 
vulnerable consumers of opportunities to develop assets, hamper 
convenient access to traditional and non-predatory banking 
products marketed to unbanked and underbanked consumers, and 
reduce low- to moderate-income consumers' abilities to save and 
acquire wealth. More research is needed to better understand the 
causal mechanisms through which the accessibility of payday 
lenders and regulations of the payday lending industry impacts 
consumers' use of payday loans, as well as the social welfare 
implications of payday loan use among consumers in the local 
economy. Deeper, macroeconomic reasons why consumers use 
alternative financial services also need to be addressed including 
declining wages,136 a greater reliance on credit and the 
135 Trey Bickham & Y ounghee Lim, In Sickness and in Debt: Do Mounting Medical 
Bills Predict Payday Loan Debt?, 54 SOC. WORK IN HEALTH CARE 518, 527 (2015). 
136 Younghee Lim et al., ,supra note 131, at 335-36. 
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disappearance of small dollar credit, 137 and increased mcome 
volatility.138 
In the meantime, however, mayors, and city council members 
should use their zoning power wisely in light of our study results. 
Our study is the first study to investigate the relationship 
between distance of payday lenders and consumers' residence. 
Until now, there has been no empirical data investigating the 
relationship between spatial distribution of payday lenders and 
consumers' use of alternative financial services. Here, we close 
this gap and provide useful data on how distance and density of 
alternative fmancial services is associated with consumers' 
likelihood of alternative financial service use. 
We do this by testing two hypotheses. Consistent with 
distance decay theory, our first major finding revealed that 
increases in the distance of payday lenders from the consumers' 
home addresses were associated with a decreased likelihood of 
payday loan use. Consistent with the localization economies 
framework, our second major finding revealed that increases in 
the density of payday lenders within 1 .5 miles of the consumers' 
home addresses were associated with an increased likelihood of 
payday loan use. 
The second finding on the association between density of 
payday lenders and payday loan use is consistent with the 
previous research findings on density of AFS and AFS use. More 
specifically, a higher density of AFS storefronts (e.g. ,  auto title 
loans, payday loans, tax refunds, pawn shops, and rent-to-own 
stores) were related to more frequent AFS use.139 Considering that 
higher density can be attributed to lax laws at the local or state 
level, this finding suggests that more lenient payday loan laws 
increase consumer use of loans: 140 
Future research should more carefully examine how local 
ordinances (namely the regulation of payday distance and density) 
impact payday loan use, controlling for other factors influencing 
consumer use of payday loans. Given that there are approximately 
137 Baradaran, supra note 84, at 533-34. 
138 Younghee Lim et al., supra note 131, at 335 (2014); Servan & Castro-Cosio, 
supra note 95, at 14-18. 
139 Friedline & Kepple, supra note 104, at 71-72 (2017). 
140 McKernan et al., supra note 20, at 217. 
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250 local ordinances pertaining to payday distance and density, 141 
new research to measure the impact of such ordinances would be 
very useful. 
Regardless of what future researchers find, however, the 
findings of this study imply important considerations for 
policymakers in locales. Many localities have ruled that payday 
lenders must be at least 500ft. (0.09 miles) away from residential 
areas. 142 According to our study results, however, the 500ft. 
threshold may be inadequate. Consumer use of payday loans 
decreases sharply up to the first 3 miles (15,840ft.) of distance 
from residence and thereafter decreases more gradually (see 
Figure 2). In a similar vein, this study found that density at a 1.5 -
mile (7,920ft.) radius is  most significant in predicting consumer 
use of payday loans (see Figure 3). Local governments that wish to 
implement payday loan ordinances to effectively reduce consumer 
use of payday loans should carefully consider the changes in the 
effect of payday loan use as miles increase and as density 
increases within a 1.5-mile radius. 
Above all, localities that wish to limit residents' use of 
payday loans should carefully examine how ordinances of distance 
and ordinances of density may interact and examine what kinds of 
ordinance combinations will yield the best outcomes for residents' 
well-being. Mayors, city council members, and city planners can 
help consumers by using their local zoning and regulatory power 
to carefully consider whether to allow payday lending in their 
cities and towns. The businesses located near our homes have a 
deep abiding influence on us, and those in control of those 
business locales have the power to change lives. 
141 Telephonic interview with Steven Graves, February 5, 2018 (Professor Graves 
keeps a database of all local ordinances as they are passed.). 
142 Martin & Mayer, supra note 2, at 1 52-53. 
